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Abstract. Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become one of the major plat-
forms for social interactions. Privacy control is deployed in popular OSNs to
protect user’s data. However, user’s sensitive information could still be leaked
even when privacy rules are properly configured. We investigate the effectiveness
of privacy control against privacy leakage from the perspective of information
flow. Our analysis reveals that the existing privacy control mechanisms do not
protect the flow of personal information effectively. By examining typical OSNs
including Facebook, Google+, and Twitter, we discover a series of privacy ex-
ploits which are caused by the conflicts between privacy control and OSN func-
tionalities. Our analysis reveals that the effectiveness of privacy control may not
be guaranteed as most OSN users expect.
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1 Introduction
Online Social Network services (OSNs) have become an essential element in modern
life where massive amount of personal data is published. Prior research [9, 3, 1] shows
that it is possible to infer undisclosed personal data from publicly shared information.
But the availability and quality of the public data causing privacy leakage are decreasing
due to the following two factors: 1) privacy control mechanisms have become the stan-
dard feature of OSNs and keep evolving [4, 2]. 2) the percentage of users who choose
not to publicly share information is also increasing [3]. In this tendency, it seems that
privacy leakage may be perfectly prevented as the increasingly comprehensive privacy
control mechanism is available to the users. However, this may not be achievable ac-
cording to our findings.
In this paper, we investigate privacy protection from a new perspective, referred to
as privacy leakage under privacy control (PLPC). PLPC examines whether a user’s pri-
vate personal information is leaked even if the user properly configures privacy rules.
The problem of PLPC in OSNs involves distributor and receiver. An adversary is a
receiver who intends to learn private information published by a victim who is a dis-
tributor. An adversary’s capabilities can be characterized according to two factors. The
first factor is the distance between adversary and victim. Considering a social network
as a directed graph, an n-hop adversary can be defined such that the length of the short-
est connected path from victim to adversary is n hops. In our discussion, we consider
1-hop adversary (i.e. friend), 2-hop adversary (i.e. friend of friend), and k-hop adver-
sary where k > 2 (i.e. stranger). The second factor is prior knowledge about a victim
required by corresponding attacks.
We examine the underlying reasons that make privacy control vulnerable using in-
formation flow based analysis. We start with categorizing the personal information of
an OSN user into three attribute sets according to who the user is, whom the user knows,
and what the user does, respectively. We model the information flow between these at-
tribute sets and examine the functionalities which control the flow. We inspect typical
real-world OSNs including Facebook, Google+, and Twitter, where privacy exploits and
corresponding attacks are identified.
Our analysis reveals that most of the privacy exploits are inherent due to the underly-
ing conflicts between privacy control and essential OSN functionalities. Therefore, the
effectiveness of privacy control may not be guaranteed even if it is technically achiev-
able.
We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows:
– We investigate the interaction between privacy control and information flow in
OSNs. We identify privacy exploits for current privacy control mechanisms in typ-
ical OSNs. Based on these privacy exploits, we introduce a series of attacks for
adversaries with different capabilities to obtain private personal information.
– We analyze the discovered exploits caused by the conflicts between privacy con-
trol and the functionalities. These conflicts reveal that the effectiveness of privacy
control may not be guaranteed as most OSN users expect.
2 Attribute Sets, Functionalities, and Information Flows In OSNs
In a typical OSN, Alice owns a profile page for publishing her personal information.
The personal information can be categorized into three attribute sets: a) personal par-
ticular set (PP set), b) social relationship set (SR set), and c) social activity set (SA
set), according to who the user is, whom the user interact with, and what the user does,
respectively. We show corresponding personal information and attribute sets on Face-
book, Google+, and Twitter in Table 1.
Table 1. Types of personal information on Facebook, Google+, and Twitter
Acronym Attribute set Facebook Google+ Twitter
PP Personal Particulars Current city, hometown, sex,
birthday, employer, university,
religion, political views, music,
emails, city, about me
Introduction, occu-
pation, employment,
education, places lived,
phone, gender
Name,
location, bio,
website
SR Social Relationship (incoming list,
outgoing list)
Friends, friends Have you in circles,
your circles
Following,
follower
SA Social Activities Status message, photo, link,
video, comments, like
Post, photo, comments,
link, video, plus 1’s
Tweets
Alice’s PP set describes persistent facts about Alice, such as gender and race. Al-
ice’s SR set stores her social relationships as connections. A connection represents in-
formation flow from a distributor to her 1-hop receiver. Alice’s SR set consists of an
incoming list and an outgoing list. For each user ui in Alice’s incoming list, there is a
connection from ui to Alice. For each user uo in Alice’s outgoing list, there is a connec-
tion from Alice to uo. Alice can receive information from the users in her incoming list,
and distribute her information to the users in her outgoing list. The social relationships
in certain OSNs such as Facebook are mutual. Such mutual relationship can be consid-
ered as a pair of connections linking two users with opposite directions. The incoming
list and outgoing list in SR set and their corresponding names on FaceBook, Google+,
and Twitter are shown in Table 1. Lastly, Alice’s SA set describes her social activities,
such as status messages and photos.
Most OSNs provide two basic functionalities including REC and TAG. REC func-
tionality recommends to Alice a list of users that Alice may include in her SR set. The
list of recommended users is composed based on the social relationships of the users in
Alice’s SR set. TAG functionality allows Alice to mention another user’s name in her
social activities, which provides a link to the user’s profile page.
The attribute sets (illustrated as circles in Figure 1) of multiple users are connected
within an OSN, where personal information may explicitly flow from a profile page to
another profile page via REC and TAG, as represented by solid arrows and rectangles
in Figure 1. It is also possible to access a user’s personal information in PP set and
SR set via implicit information flows marked by dashed arrows. The details about these
information flows are described below.
Attribute Set X
Functionality Y
Profile Page Z
Fig. 1. Information flows between attribute sets
The first explicit flow is caused by REC, as shown in arrow (1) in Figure 1. REC
recommends to Bob a list of users based on the social relationships of the users in Bob’s
SR set. Thus the undisclosed users in Alice’s SRmay be recommended to Bob via REC,
if Bob is connected with Alice.
The second explicit flow is caused by TAG is shown in arrow (2) in Figure 1. An
OSN user may mention other users’ names in a social activity in his/her SA set via TAG,
which creates explicit links connecting SA sets within different profile pages.
The third flow is an implicit flow caused by the design of information storage for
SR sets, as shown in arrow (3) in Figure 1. Given a connection from Alice to Bob, Bob
is included in Alice’s outgoing list while Alice is included in Bob’s incoming list.
The fourth flow is an implicit flow related to PP set, which is shown as the arrow (4)
in Figure 1. Due to the homophily effect [6], a user is willing to connect with the users
with similar personal particulars. This tendency can be used to link PP sets of multiple
users.
It is difficult to prevent privacy leakage from all these information flows. A user
may be able to prevent privacy leakage caused by explicit information flows by care-
fully using corresponding functionalities, as these flows are materialized only when the
functionalities are used. However, it is difficult to avoid privacy leakage due to implicit
information flows, as they are caused by inherent correlations among the information
shared in OSNs. In fact, all these four information flows illustrated in Figure 1 corre-
spond to inherent exploits, which will be analyzed in Section 3.
3 Exploits And Attacks
In this section, we analyze the exploits and attacks to a victim’s PP set, SR set, and SA
set. All of our findings have been verified on Facebook, Google+, and Twitter.
3.1 PP Set
The undisclosed information in PP set can be inferred by the following exploit, namely
inferable personal particular.
Inferable Personal Particular Human beings are more likely to interact with oth-
ers who have the same or similar personal particulars [6]. The phenomenon is called
homophily. This causes an exploit named inferable personal particulars, which corre-
sponds to the information flow shown as dashed arrow (4) in Figure 1.
Exploit 1: If most of a victim’s friends have similar personal particulars, it could be
inferred that the victim may have the same or similar personal particulars.
An adversary may use Exploit 1 to obtain undisclosed information in a victim’s PP
set. The following is a typical attack on Facebook.
Fig. 2. Alice and most of her friends have common employer information
Attack 1: Considering a scenario on Facebook shown in Figure 2, Bob, Carl, Derek,
and some other users are Alice’s friends, and Bob is a friend of Carl, Derek, and most
of Alice’s friends. Alice shares her employer information “XXX Agency” with Carl and
Derek. Most of Alice’s friends may share their employer information with their friends
due to different perceptions in privacy protection. Bob can collect the employer infor-
mation of Alice’s friends and infer that Alice’s employer may be “XXX Agency”.
The above attack works on Facebook, Google+, and Twitter. An adversary should
have two types of knowledge. The first type of knowledge includes a large portion of
users stored in the victim’s SR set. The second type of knowledge includes the personal
particulars of these users.
3.2 SR Set
The information in SR set can be leaked by two exploits, namely inferable social rela-
tionship and unregulated relationship recommendation.
Inferable Social Relationship A user’s SR set consists of incoming list and outgoing
list. Given a connection from Alice to Carl, Carl is recorded in Alice’s outgoing list
while Alice is recorded in Carl’s incoming list. This causes an exploit named inferable
social relationship, which corresponds to the information flow shown as dashed arrow
(3) in Figure 1.
Exploit 2: Each social relationship in a victim’s SR set indicates a connection between
the victim and another user u. User u’s SR set also stores a copy of this relationship
for the same connection, which can be used to infer the relationship in the victim’s SR
set.
An adversary may use Exploit 2 to obtain undisclosed social relationships in a vic-
tim’s SR set, which is shown as the following exemplary attack on Facebook.
Attack 2: Considering a scenario on Facebook, where Bob is a stranger to Alice, and
Carl is Alice’s friend. Alice shares her SR set with a user group including Carl. Bob
guesses Carl may be connected with Alice, but cannot confirm this by viewing Alice’s
SR set as it is protected against him. However, Carl shares his SR set publicly due to
different concerns in privacy protection. Seeing Alice in Carl’s SR set, Bob infers that
Carl is Alice’s friend.
Any adversary can use Exploit 2 as long as he has two types of knowledge: 1) a list
of users in the victim’s SR set; 2) social relationships in these users’ SR sets. This attack
could be a stepping stone for an adversary to infiltrate a victim’s social network. Once
the adversary discovers a victim’s friends and becomes a friend of the victim’s friends.
After that, he is more likely to be accepted as the victim’s friend [7].
Unregulated Relationship Recommendation Most OSNs provide REC functionality
to recommend a list of other users whom this user may know. The recommendation list
is usually calculated based on the relationships in SR set but not regulated by the privacy
rules chosen by the users in the recommendation list. This causes an exploit named
unregulated relationship recommendation, which corresponds to the information flow
shown as solid arrow (1) in Figure 1.
Exploit 3: All social relationships in a victim’s SR set could be automatically recom-
mended by REC to all users in the victim’s SR set, irrespective of whether or not the
victim uses any privacy rules to protect her SR set.
An adversary may use Exploit 3 to obtain undisclosed relationships in a victim’s SR
set, which is shown in the following attack on Facebook.
Attack 3: On Facebook, Bob is a friend of Alice, but not in a user group named
Close Friends. Alice shares her SR set with Close Friends only. Although
Bob is not allowed to view Alice’s social relationships in her SR set, such information
is automatically recommended by REC to Bob. If Bob is connected with Alice only, the
recommendation list consists of the social relationships in Alice’s SR set only.
Any adversary who is a friend of a victim can perform the attack on both Facebook
and Google+. No prior knowledge is required for this attack.
3.3 SA Set
The undisclosed information in SA set protected by existing privacy control mecha-
nisms can be inferred due to the following exploit, inferable social activity.
Inferable Social Activity A user’s name can be mentioned by the other in a social
activity via TAG such that this social activity provides a link to the profile page of the
mentioned user. Such links create correlations among all the users involved in the same
activity. This causes an exploit named inferable social activity, which corresponds to
the information flow shown as solid arrow (2) in Figure 1.
Exploit 4: If a victim’s friend uses TAG to mention the victim in a social activity pub-
lished by the victim’s friend, it implies that the victim may also attend the activity.
Although this activity may involve the victim, the visibility of this activity is solely de-
termined by the privacy rules specified by the victim’s friend who publishes the activity,
which is out of the control of the victim.
An adversary may use Exploit 4 to obtain undisclosed social activities in a victim’s
SA set, which is shown in the following attack on Facebook.
Attack 4: Considering a scenario on Facebook, where Bob and Carl are Alice’s friends,
and Bob is Carl’s friend. Alice publishes a social activity in her SA set regarding a party
which Carl and she attended together and she allows Carl only to view this social activ-
ity. However, Carl publishes the same social activity in his SA set and mentions Alice
via TAG. Due to different concerns in privacy protection, Carl allows all his friends
to view this social activity. By viewing Carl’s social activity, Bob can infer that Alice
attended this party.
This attack may work on Facebook, Google+, and Twitter. Any adversary can per-
form this attack if he knows the social activities published by the victim’s friends point-
ing to the victim via TAG.
To mitigate the threat, the privacy control should enforce privacy rules to an activity
no matter who publishes it. To resolve privacy conflicts in collaborative data sharing,
policy negotiation mechanisms have been proposed [5, 8]. However, these policy nego-
tiation mechanisms may significantly restrict the sharing nature of OSNs and frustrate
users who intend to share that activity, as the consents of all involved users are required
for each joint activity.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated privacy leakage under privacy control in online social
networks. Our analysis showed that privacy leakage could still happen even when users
correctly configure their privacy rules. We examined real-world OSNs including Face-
book, Google+, and Twitter, and discovered the exploits which lead to privacy leakage.
The detailed attacks were demonstrated by utilizing these exploits to learn undisclosed
personal information that is supposed to be protected by the corresponding privacy
rules. Our analysis further revealed that these exploits are associated with the underline
conflicts between privacy control and functionalities, which are difficult to resolve.
Acknowledgment
This research is supported by the Singapore National Research Foundation under its
International Research Centre @ Singapore Funding Initiative and administered by the
IDM Programme Office.
References
1. M. Balduzzi, C. Platzer, T. Holz, E. Kirda, D. Balzarotti, and C. Kruegel. Abusing social
networks for automated user profiling. In Proceedings of the 13th international conference on
Recent advances in intrusion detection, pages 422–441, 2010.
2. B. Carminati, E. Ferrari, R. Heatherly, M. Kantarcioglu, and B. Thuraisingham. A semantic
web based framework for social network access control. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM
symposium on Access control models and technologies, pages 177–186, 2009.
3. A. Chaabane, G. Acs, and M. A. Kaafar. You are what you like! information leakage through
users interests. In Proceedings of the 19th annual network & distributed system security
symposium, 2012.
4. P. Fong, M. Anwar, and Z. Zhao. A privacy preservation model for facebook-style social
network systems. In Computer Security – ESORICS 2009, volume 5789, pages 303–320,
2009.
5. H. Hu, G.-J. Ahn, and J. Jorgensen. Detecting and resolving privacy conflicts for collaborative
data sharing in online social networks. In Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference, pages 103–112, 2011.
6. M. McPherson, L. Smith-Lovin, and J. M. Cook. Birds of a feather: Homophily in social
networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 27:415–444, 2001.
7. D. J. Watts. Small worlds: the dynamics of networks between order and randomness. Princeton
University Press, 1999.
8. A. Yamada, T.-J. Kim, and A. Perrig. Exploiting privacy policy conflicts in online social
networks. Technical report, Carnegie Mellon University, 2012.
9. E. Zheleva and L. Getoor. To join or not to join: the illusion of privacy in social networks with
mixed public and private user profiles. In Proceedings of the 18th international conference on
World wide web, pages 531–540, 2009.
